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• We study whether groups make more strategic market entry decisions.
• We find that groups are more informed than individuals.
• Nevertheless groups make similarly biased market entry decisions failing to learn from feedback and repetition.
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We investigate the possibility of group discussion serving as an implicit information channel to eliminate
biased entry decisions into experimentalmarkets.We find that groups aremore informed than individuals
in their beliefs. Nevertheless they make similarly biased market entry decisions failing to learn from
feedback and repetition.
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Previous research has shown that the industrieswith high entry
rates tend to have high rates of business failure independent of the
size of the industry, the profitability or barriers to entry (Dunne
et al., 1988; Mata and Portugal, 1994; Geroski, 1996). Motivated
by these findings, Camerer and Lovallo (1999) link the success of
entrants in experimental markets to their performance in a trivia
quiz and explain excess entry by entrepreneurial overconfidence.
Moore and Cain (2007, henceforth M&C) replicate Camerer and
Lovallo’s experiment extending it to involve difficult as well
as simple quizzes. Subjects enter excessively into markets with
simple and insufficiently intomarkets with difficult quizzes against
the benchmark condition where entrants’ success is determined
randomly.1
E-mail address: z.murad@surrey.ac.uk.
1 Cain et al. (2015) further show that overconfidence in simple and undercon-
fidence in difficult tasks can explain current trends in market entry behaviour in
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2016.04.032
0165-1765/© 2016 The Author. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access articlM&C attribute this difference in entry rates to asymmetric
information one possesses about self versus others. Providing
explicit information on competitors’ performance demonstrably
decreases competitive entry failures in foregone profits and direct
losses (Radzevick andMoore, 2008; Ewers, 2012). In this paper, we
investigate the possibility of group discussion providing implicit
information in market entry games with simple and difficult quiz
tasks. We speculate that group discussion may deliver additional
information about general knowledge and quiz difficulty among
participants in the experiment. This additional information in turn
may help infer competitors’ performance leading tomore strategic
market entry decisions.
A further rationale to study groups’ competitive entry decisions
is that many important real world competitions are between
groups rather than individuals, such as in inter-organizational
grant contests and sports tournaments. It is, hence, not surprising
the field: controlling for entry barriers, entry rates are below market capacity in
markets perceived as difficult (e.g. metal mining, forestry, agricultural) and above
market capacity in markets perceived as simple (e.g. food stores, hobby shops).
under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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Experimental payoffs from entering into market.
Rank Payoff
1st £14
2nd £10
3rd £5
4th −£10
5th −£10
6th −£10
7th −£10
Staying out paid £0. Losses were subtracted from
the £10 endowment subjects received at the
beginning of the experiment.
that recently, group decision making has aroused considerable
interest in economic research. The main finding has been
that groups make more self-interested strategic decisions, are
cognitively more sophisticated than individuals and learn faster
(reviewed by Charness and Sutter, 2012). Kocher and Sutter
(2005) and Sutter (2005) show that groups of three perform
better in beauty contest games compared to individuals. Market
entry games are similar to beauty contest games with an
analogous requirement to engage in hierarchical reasoning and act
strategically based on predictions of other players’ decisions. We
thus test whether groups’ decisions aremore strategic to start with
and whether groups are more likely to learn from repetition and
feedback compared to individuals.
2. Experimental design
We replicated M&C’s design as a baseline condition (Individual)
and extended it with a treatment condition (Group) and a control
condition (IndInfo) to investigate whether group discussion led to
better informed andmore strategic entry decisions. Individual and
IndInfo conditions were identical except in the IndInfo condition
subjects were given additional information on the average number
of correct answers per quiz in previous sessions before their
entry decisions took place. In the Group treatment, 21 participants
were randomly allocated group numbers and seated in separated
cubicles in groups of three. Groupmembers could talk face-to-face
among themselves without being heard by others and submit one
decision per group in each round.
The experiment consisted of a 12 round market entry game
with 7 players deciding simultaneously whether to enter a market
or to stay out. Payoffs were determined according to Table 1
and were common knowledge.2 Each player had to submit one
decision per round indicating their choice. There were four
simple, four difficult and four random rounds, where the ranks of
entrants were determined according to their scores respectively
in simple and difficult quizzes and randomly. The rounds were
presented to subjects either in Simple–Random–Difficult or
Difficult–Random–Simple order with the quiz order also re-
shuffled across sessions to avoid any order effects.
The quizzes were pre-tested on British students so that the
variance in answers between the subjects would be minimal: out
of 5, the correct answers averaged to 0.65 (s.d. 0.70) in the difficult
and 4.3 (s.d. 0.9) in the easy quizzes. Thus, winning in a quiz round
wasmostly due to luck, whichmade it very comparable to random
rounds. Additionally, players’ decisions in random rounds acted as
within-subject control for their risk attitudes and the difference in
entry rates into random and quiz rounds was our primarymeasure
of excessive and insufficient entry.
2 Each group member earned the same amount in order to keep the marginal
incentive for each player constant and comparable to the individual conditions.Table 2
Testing for the equality of beliefs.
Dependent variable: Mean absolute difference between predicted and actual
Q1 Simple Difficult Random
Individual 0.21 (0.28) 0.13 (0.28) −0.21 (0.25)
IndInfo −0.17 (0.27) −0.46 (0.29) −0.08 (0.22)
Constant 1.21 (0.19)*** 1.46 (0.19)*** 1.29
(0.19)***
N 504 504 497
Q2 Simple Difficult
Individual 0.11 (0.22) 0.27 (0.20)
IndInfo −0.47 (0.11)*** −0.01 (0.14)
Constant 1.79 (0.06)*** 1.89 (0.13)***
N 504 503
Q3 Simple Difficult
Individual 1.15 (0.51)** 0.90 (0.59)
IndInfo 0.21 (0.06)*** −0.25 (0.04)***
Constant 0.22 (0.05)*** 0.48 (0.04)***
N 502 502
Q4 Simple Difficult
Individual 0.47 (0.32) 1.05 (0.39)**
IndInfo −0.17 (0.05)*** −0.14 (0.09)
Constant 0.69 (0.05)*** 0.84 (0.05)***
N 504 503
Q5 Simple Difficult
Individual −0.03 (0.22) 0.46 (0.26)*
IndInfo −0.24 (0.27) −0.03 (0.18)
Constant 1.61 (0.11)*** 1.10 (0.16)***
N 341 190
The reported coefficients are from an OLS regression with the baseline Group.
Clustered standard errors at session level are reported in parentheses.
*10%, **5%, ***1% significance levels.
Following M&C, we elicited beliefs of players after their entry
decisions with the following unincentivized questions3:
Q1. How many players in total do you think entered the market
this round? Include yourself in this figure if you chose to enter.
Q2. How many of the other six players in this round do you think
scored higher than you did? (regardless of whether anyone
entered).
Q3. Howmany quiz questions do you think you got correct in this
round?
Q4. Howmany quiz questions do you think the average player got
correct this round?
Q5. If you chose to enter the market this round, what rank do you
think you will get?
After answering these questions, every individual/group received
full feedback on their own and others’ quiz scores, entry decisions
and rankings.
In total 210 British students recruited through ORSEE (Greiner,
2015) participated in 18 experimental sessions at the University
of Nottingham yielding 6 independent clusters per treatment.
The experiment lasted 60 min with an average payment of
£11.70 determined according to a random incentive scheme
across rounds. The design was partly computerized using the
software Ztree (Fischbacher, 2007) and partly pen-and-paper to
accommodate for the open-ended-answer format of quizzes.4
3 Sutter et al. (2013) report significant differences in belief formation process
between groups and individuals. For the purposes of replication, we chose to keep
the belief elicitation in the Group treatment the same and not restrict what groups
could report and how.
4 See Appendix A for the experimental instructions, quizzes, a sample feedback
screen and decision sheet.
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Testing for the equality of entry rates.
Mean difference Rounds 1–6 Rounds 7–12
MS–MD MS–MR MD–MR MS–MD MS–MR MD–MR
Pairwise test of mean difference between simple, random and difficult rounds equals to zero
Individual 4.00 (0.29)** 1.75 (0.11)** −2.25 (0.33)** 1.67 (0.42)** 1.00 (0.29)** −0.07 (0.36)
Group 4.58 (0.57)** 1.83 (0.38)** −2.75 (0.38)** 1.42 (0.66)* 1.92 (0.30)** 0.50 (0.62)
IndInfo 2.58 (0.30)** 1.17 (0.28)** −1.42 (0.51)** 0.08 (0.49) 0.42 (0.38) 0.33 (0.44)
p-values from a pairwise test of equality of mean differences between treatment conditions
Group = Individual 0.3743 0.7992 0.3708 0.6279 0.0613 0.1705
Group = IndInfo 0.0240 0.2469 0.0641 0.2248 0.0147 0.9358
Individual = IndInfo 0.0121 0.0750 0.1970 0.0325 0.2850 0.1201
MS: Mean Entry in Simple, MR: Mean Entry in Random and MD: Mean Entry in Difficult round. Standard errors are in parentheses. P-values are
fromWilcoxon ranksum test.
**5%, ***1% significance levels according to matched pair signed rank test.3. Results
3.1. Are groups better informed than individuals?
In Table 2we test for the accuracy in beliefs of groups compared
to individuals for each of the five belief elicitation questions.
Overall we find that groups are slightly more informed than
individuals: their predictions of own score (Q3) in the simple
rounds, average score (Q4) and own rank conditional on entry
(Q5) in the difficult rounds is significantly more accurate than that
of individuals. However groups are not as accurate as individuals
with additional information: all beliefs in the IndInfo condition,
except in Q3 of simple rounds, aremore accurate than in the Group
treatment.
3.2. Do groups make more strategic market entry decisions?
Fig. 1 plots the entry rates in each treatment across 12
rounds and shows a successful replication of M&C’s results in
our Individual treatment. Table 3 tests for the significance of
entry biases across treatments in the first and second halves of
the experiment. We observe no difference between Individual
and Group treatment in the first half of the experiment where
both individuals and groups enter excessively into simple and
insufficiently into difficult rounds compared to their entry rates
in random rounds. In the second half of the experiment we stillobserve significant bias in entry decisions of groups and individuals
with significantly higher excess entry of groups into simple rounds.
In the IndInfo treatment on the other hand, we observe more
strategic entry decisions with a lower difference in entry rates be-
tween quiz and random rounds in the first half which completely
disappears in the second half of the experiment. In Appendix B, we
present a plot of mean payoffs across rounds for each treatment
condition and test for treatment differences in mean payoffs. We
find that, overall, groups earn slightly more than individuals in the
Individual but less than those in the IndInfo condition. This differ-
ence in earnings is mainly due to the significant differences in pay-
offs in the simple rounds of the experiment, accentuating the im-
plications of excessive entry intomarkets. This result in turn shows
the economic significance of biased entry decisions and how ex-
plicit information in the IndInfo treatment but not implicit infor-
mation in the Group treatment made subjects more money.
4. Conclusion
A recent research agenda in business and economics literature
has investigated the effects of incorrect beliefs on individuals’
decisions to enter excessively into competitions with easy and
avoid competitions with difficult tasks. Additional information
on competitors’ performances in turn has been shown to correct
those beliefs and decrease competitive entry failures (Radzevick
and Moore, 2008; Ewers, 2012). As a novel research question
28 Z. Murad / Economics Letters 144 (2016) 25–28we propose that group discussion provides implicit information
channel leading to more strategic market entry decisions. Our
experiment confirms that groups hold more accurate beliefs than
individuals in predicting their own and others’ performance and
ranks. However, we do not find any evidence of this leading to
more strategic entry decisions: both individuals and groups enter
excessively into simple and insufficiently into difficult markets
and earn less than individuals who are provided with explicit
performance information.
One caveat to our study in concluding that groups make similar
entry decision to individuals is our focus on face-to-face group
discussion and joint entry decisions. This however is one of the
most natural environments that group decisionmaking takes place
in the ‘‘wild’’ and is a good starting point to answerwhether groups
make more strategic competitive entry decisions than individuals.
Other group environments, such as voting on the entry decision or
individual decision making following group discussion, are areas
for further research.
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